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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the adjustment behaviour and adjustment speed of Chinese firms 
with regards to capital structure. For this purpose, the study utilises an extensive set of data 
of 867 A-Listed non-financial Chinese firms over ten years from 2003 to 2012. This study 
adds useful insights on adjustment behaviour and speed of Chinese firms with regards to 
firm-specific and country level determinants of leverage policy. To find out the adjustment 
speed, the study uses multiple generalised method of moments (GMM) for the purpose 
of robustness. Both of the GMMs report positive and their adjustment coefficients are 
statistically significant which implies that Chinese firms follow a target level of leverage by 
adjusting their current leverage policy. Chinese firms take almost 3.5 years for adjustment. 
The analysis is extrapolated to state owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state owned 
enterprises (NSOEs) and it is found that SOEs take longer time to adjust to their leverage 
policy as compared to NSOEs. The results are consistent for both Arellano Bond (GMM1) 
and Blundell and Bond (GMM2) dynamic panel data models.
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INTRODUCTION
Capital structure has become an important subject of study since Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) proposed their classical theory of irrelevance, that is, the value of 
a company is independent of its capital structure in a perfect financial market. In 
the past half century, various theories have been developed to explain corporate 
financial decisions including the trade-off theory (Miller, 1977), the pecking order 
theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), the agency cost theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
and the market timing theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). 
Literature shows that limited research, both theoretical and empirical, has 
focused on developing countries. Factors which influence the capital structure of 
firms in developed countries are also relevant to firms in developing countries 
(Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; Chen, Jiang, & Lin, 
2014), but the institutional features can lead to distinct differences (Huang & Song, 
2006; Chen, 2004; Wald, 1999). For example, in the US, more than 62% non-
financial companies raise their capital through internal financing while in China, 
more than 50% such firms rely on equity issuance or debt financing to raise capital 
(Chen, 2004). 
Adjustment towards optimal capital structure needs a developed capital 
market for equity and bonds. In the US, the bond market accounts for 175% of 
GDP and in Japan 198% of GDP (Saleem, 2013). Various theories have been 
proposed by researchers to explain capital structure adjustment and its determinants 
but mainly literature is focused on trade-off and pecking order theories. On the 
basis of these theories many key variables have been identified such as firm size, 
growth opportunity, profitability, tangible assets, etc. (Booth et al., 2001; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Firms strive to attain the target level capital structure that they have set for 
themselves but the adjustment speed depends on the degree of rationality of the 
firm and on the costs and benefits associated with the adjustment process. Rational 
firms with no agency problems find it easy to adjust their target leverage but the 
adjustment speed depends on the cost of adjustment. When the cost of adjustment 
is less than the benefits gained from the adjustment, the firms will be quick to 
adjust their existing leverage ratio to target leverage ratio (Qian, Tian, & Wirjanto, 
2009).
Being the second largest economy in the world, China is playing an 
increasingly influential role as an emerging economy in the global economic 
system. However, this economic development was achieved without a modern 
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financial system in the region (Chen et al., 2014). For example, the bond market in 
China is still in its early stages and treasury bills amount to only 3% of corporate 
bond issuance (Zhang, 2008).
The Chinese economy is still in a transitional phase and adapting to a 
market oriented economic system, even its securities markets were formed in the 
1990s. According to Chen (2004), capital market development and growth of non-
state owned enterprise (NSOE) sector were hampered by state monopolies. The 
ownership structure in Chinese listed firms has government predominance (Sun 
& Tong, 2003). The government controls the stocks of many listed state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Even after the split share reform in 2005, the government 
continues to control and influence the choice of capital structure of listed 
companies (Liu, Tian, & Wang, 2011). This formation provides significant support 
to the agency conflict between managers and investors as managers have less 
rights to take part in a company's capital structure decisions: with a low percentage 
of ownership, managers are interested in getting personal benefits rather than 
increasing investors' wealth and value of a company (Chen et al., 2014).
Till now, little work has been done regarding capital structure adjustments 
for non-financial firms in China. Keeping this in mind, this study is conducted 
to find out the differences between SOEs and NSOEs for the period of 2003–
2012. This time period is very important as China has implemented new financial 
policies and Chinese firms also faced a great amount of financial distress because 
of financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
An Overview of Chinese Market Reforms for SOEs and NSOEs
The considerable economic restructuring and reforms undergone by the Chinese 
economy over the last 30 years have led to a marked increase in the number of 
shareholding companies, Chinese firms, SOEs and NSOEs. SOEs and NSOEs 
differ in the nature of their ownership, agency relations, and bankruptcy risks. 
The emergence of the stock market has been playing a very significant role in 
the Chinese economy since it has overlapped with the process of privatisation 
of Chinese state owned enterprises. The number of listed firms in 1992 was 50; 
however it increased to 1,378 by 2004. The number of listed NSOEs was 353 
in 2004 which made up 25% of the total listed firms. This number was smaller 
compared to number of listed SOEs, however the market value of these 353 
NSOEs accounted for 12.1% of the total market value. A numbers of reforms 
have been introduced with the development of the Chinese stock market, Notably 
the corporatisation involving initial public offering of a minority portion of state 
shares to individual investors who can trade their shares freely on the Shanghai and 
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Shenzhen stock exchanges. These newly listed companies are still controlled by 
state through majority share holdings. With this position, the government enjoys 
two very significant rights, i.e., disposal of assets during mergers and acquisitions 
and appointment of CEOs. Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995) and Faccio (2006) 
argue that these two rights ensure that SOEs have a low risk of bankruptcy because 
the government can exercise its right of subsidizing the ailing SOEs. Moreover, the 
government as the majority shareholder provides a number of incentives to these 
companies, including tax reduction, partial or full repayment of debt, swapping 
debt with equity and formation of state owned asset management companies to 
pool in funds to finance the debt burdens.
Moreover banks follow a pecking order in advancing finances to different 
companies as advised by government whereby SOEs are favoured in bank loans 
(Brandt & Li, 2003). In contrast, banks' loan granting decisions to NSOEs are 
based largely on financial rather than political considerations. Because of these 
reasons it becomes very important to study the adjustment behaviour of leverage 
in Chinese SOEs and NSOEs.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Capital Structure Theories and Adjustment Towards Optimal Capital 
Structure 
Researchers have given multiple theories to determine optimal capital structure 
choices for firms but still the knowledge is very limited. Capital structure is a debt 
to equity ratio and shows how a company finances its operations. Many theories 
explain the corporate capital structure. It is important to know the difference of 
opinion among those theories about the target capital structure. In this regard, this 
study considers the agency theory, the theory of Modigliani and Miller, the trade-
off theory and the pecking order theory. The second part of this chapter describes 
the various determinants of capital structure.
Modigliani and Miller theory and target capital structure
The first theorem of capital structure by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests 
that "the market value of the company is dependent on its capital structure given 
continued expected rate of return corresponding to its class". In other words, capital 
structure does not affect the amount of cash flows that the company may divide 
among its shareholders and debt holders and does not affect the total value of 
company's debt and equity (Titman & Grinblatt, 1998). This theorem also assumes 
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that there is a perfect capital market with full competition and no transaction 
costs, taxes, asymmetric information, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, or arbitrage 
opportunities (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). So, this theory does not assume target 
capital structure for firms. 
H1: According to Modigliani and Miller, firms do not follow a target 
level of capital structure.
Pecking order theory (POT)
Pecking order theory (POT) proposed by Myers (1984) is one of the main theories 
of capital structure which explains the determinants that influence the capital 
structure decisions of firms. This theory explains how the firms finance new 
investments. Myers (1984) suggested that firms finance a new investment first 
internally or through retained earnings and then with external funds like debts 
or equity. Information asymmetry is a problem which is associated with external 
financing because managers usually possess more knowledge than the investors. 
So, according to Myers and Majluf (1984), firms prefer internal financing over 
external financing to resolve the information asymmetry problem. This is called 
the "pecking order" which prefers internal funds (retained earnings) over external 
funds and in case of external funds, debt is preferred over equity financing. This 
specific pattern of financing provides no reason for firms to follow a target capital 
structure.
H2: According to the pecking order theory, firms do not follow a 
target level of capital structure.
Trade-off theory and target capital structure
Trade-off theory (TOT) is one of the important theories to explain the determinants 
of capital structure of firms. According to this theory, optimal capital structure is 
achieved by a trade-off between costs and benefits associated with leverage in a 
perfect market environment. This theory suggests that optimal capital structure 
is attained when marginal benefits derived from the costs of debt and benefits 
associated with debt financing are equivalent. This concept is known as the static 
trade-off theory. Optimal capital structure is a function of multiple internal and 
external factors and these factors change over time due to dynamic nature of the 
firms. So, firms achieve their target capital structure by considering the dynamic 
environment in which they carry out their activities (Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 
1989). Given the uniqueness of Chinese institutional infrastructure and economic 
environment, it is important to examine the determinants of the target capital 
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structure of Chinese firms and contribute to literature from the perspective of 
developing countries. Findings from China will be of particular relevance to other 
developing countries and emerging economies.
H3: According to trade-off theory, firms follow optimal (target) 
leverage.
Agency theory
Agency theory proffers a description of changes in capital structure. This theory 
explains the difference between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) as 
both have their own objectives to pursue. Managers (agents) have strong incentives 
to invest in activities that hope to offer high payoffs if they are successful, even 
if the probability of success is low. If the outcome is good then managers earn 
the gain but if it turns out badly then investors (principals) bear most of the costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
It is therefore important to find ways to control the agent, which can 
be done with various controlling measures. For example, there are monitoring 
costs and bonding costs of the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because of the 
bonding costs, the agent will be more reliable in the eyes of the principal. Another 
option is to issue more debt so that the managers can be monitored effectively by 
debt holders (Ibrahimo & Barros, 2009). Considering its basic assumptions and 
implications, the agency theory describes the changes in the capital structure but it 
does not explain the concept of optimal or target capital structure.
H4: According to agency theory, firms do not have any target level 
of leverage.
Empirical Literature Review of Target Capital Structure
Various theories have been proposed to determine the factors of capital structure 
of firms but only the trade-off theory gives clear assumptions for target capital 
structure. This theory states that when marginal benefits and costs of debt financing 
overlap each other, then firms attain their optimal capital structure. The trade-off 
theory can be classified into two forms: the static trade-off theory and dynamic 
trade-off theory. The static trade-off theory states that actual and desired leverage 
ratios are the same (Myers, 1984). On the other hand, the dynamic theory states 
that a firm defines its target leverage and makes adjustments towards achieving 
this target (Myers, 1984; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). Other theories (pecking 
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order, agency cost and market timing) assume that firms do not have target leverage 
so they do not make adjustment to target leverage. 
Little empirical work has been done to provide evidence of target leverage 
and the cost of adjustment in non-financial firms of developing or emerging 
economies as most studies are focused on developed countries. A study by De 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) on a sample of 133 Spanish non-financial firms has 
shown how firm-specific and institutional factors affect capital structure choices 
by using the instrumental variable approach of Arellano and Bond (1991). They 
found that Spanish firms incur adjustment cost to achieve their target leverage and 
that this cost is comparatively lower for them than it is for the non-financial firms 
of the United States because of greater reliance on debt and lower development of 
the Spanish bond market.
In another study by Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) on a sample of 90 
Swiss non-financial firms, it is argued that growing firms adjust their target leverage 
easily but within a dynamic model specification when economic conditions are 
supportive and showing positive development. It can be assumed that adjustment 
costs are low and do not hinder the adjustment process. But in another study by 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), which reports the target leverage adjustment for US 
firms at 30% per year, it is mentioned that 30% adjustment speed is three times 
higher than what has usually been reported by other studies. Antoniou, Guney and 
Paudyal (2008) compare the adjustment speed of target leverage for non-financial 
firms in market-based economies and bank-based economies and find that non-
financial firms in market-based economies adjust to their target leverage faster 
than those in bank-based economies. They argue that bank-based economies do 
not depend on debt to ensure the creditworthiness of a company to investors in the 
market and firms are more vigilant and have to incur the cost of being off-target 
against agency expenses. If this cost is more than the adjustment cost then the 
adjustment speed will be slow.
In another empirical study, Getzmann, Lang and Spremann (2014) have 
used a sample of 1301 non-financial firms listed in the Asian financial markets for 
the period 1995–2009 to find the capital structure determinants and adjustment 
speed toward target leverage by using the technique of generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimation. They provide evidence that the adjustment speed 
of non-financial firms in Asia towards their target leverage ranges from 27% to 
39%. These results are comparable to the results reported by Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) for US firms. 
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Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) find that the adjustment cost is low in a 
sample of 178 South African non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg stock 
market for the period of 1998–2008. They use GMM technique to determine the 
cost and speed of adjustment and find that the adjustment cost of total debt is 0.345 
and of long term debt is 0.198, which implies an adjustment speed of 0.665 and 
0.802, respectively. These results are comparable to the results for Spanish firms in 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001).
Haron, Ibrahim, Nor and Ibrahim (2013) provide evidence from 590 non-
financial firms listed in Malaysia that firms make adjustments to target leverage 
as they deviate from it. The authors have used a partial adjustment model and the 
GMM technique and found that the adjustment cost is lower than the adjustment 
speed, which are 0.43 and 0.57, respectively. A study on 148 non-financial firms 
listed on Borsa Istanbul for the period 1998–2010 by Arioglu and Tuan (2014) 
reports the adjustment speed to target leverage to be about 29%, which is quite 
comparable to the findings from developed markets. 
A study by Chinese researchers, Qian et al. (2009), on a sample of 650 
Chinese private listed firms for the period of 1999–2004, found that the Chinese 
private firms set their target leverage ratio but their adjustment speed is very slow. 
Further, they found that the relationship of firm size, tangibility and ownership 
structure with the firm's leverage ratio is positive while profitability, non-debt tax 
shields, growth and volatility are negatively correlated with leverage ratio.
Tian, Han and Zhang (2015) found that Chinese public manufacturing 
firms adjust their target leverage at different speeds that depend on their life 
cycle stages. The researchers have used a business life cycle model proposed by 
Dickinson (2001) for the period of 1999 to 2011 to investigate the determination of 
their capital structures. They found that firms in different life cycle stages behave 
differently to adjust their target capital structures. They also found that cash flow 
patterns have a stronger impact on capital structure than the firm's age.
DETERMINANTS OF TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE
This section explains different factors that determine the capital structure of a 
firm. Various studies have been carried out to explain three categories of factors 
determining target leverage, i.e., firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic 
factors (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; DeJong, Nguyen, & Kabir, 
2008; Jeveer, 2013) as well as adjustment rate towards target leverage (Drobetz & 
Wanzenried, 2006; Tongkong, 2012; Getzmann et al., 2014). Antoniou et al. (2008) 
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argue that different countries like the UK, the US, France, Germany and Japan 
share similar factors determining capital structures of firms but their importance 
varies because of different governance structures in each of these countries. So 
country specific factors are also needed in determining the capital structure of 
firms as firm and industry specific factors alone cannot explain the same. So, in this 
study, economic growth (GDP growth rate) and inflation are taken as the country 
specific factors to determine the capital structure of Chinese firms along with other 
firm level factors. 
Size 
Pecking order theory (POT) and trade-off theory (TOT) have similar views about 
adjustment towards target leverage as both consider firm size a factor in this regard. 
Since adjustment involves costs, which might be smaller for larger firms, therefore 
larger firms are expected to adjust speedily towards leverage targets.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) used four variables of tangible assets, market 
to book ratio, size, and profitability to determine their relationship with capital 
structure in the economies of G7 countries. They found a positive relationship 
between size and the level of debt. Wald (1999) also found a positive relationship 
between size and leverage for firms in the US, the UK, Germany and France.
For China, however, researchers have found mixed results for size and 
leverage. Chen and Strange (2005) and Huang and Song (2006) have shown that 
there is a positive relationship between size and leverage for the firms in China but 
Tong and Green (2005), Anwar and Sun (2013), and Zou and Xiao (2006) have 
shown that leverage and size are negatively correlated. 
Growth Potential
Growth opportunities also influence the capital structure as has been suggested 
by different researchers and theories. For example, Myers (1977) and Titman and 
Wessels (1988) suggest that growing firms have more flexibility to choose their 
future investment. According to the pecking order theory, in the first place firms 
prefer to finance a new investment with internal funds and then through external 
financing. This predicts that growing firms have lower leverage. Deesomsak, 
Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) have shown that there is a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage. So it can be assumed that adjustment 
process for growing firms to achieve their optimal capital structure will be faster 
as growing firms would have flexible capital structure choices to gain their target 
capital structure.
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The agency problem also applies to the relationship between growth and 
leverage. The choices of investment are made by managers (agents). When there 
is more flexibility in financial investments as suggested by Titman and Wessels 
(1988) then managers will also be more flexible in financing their investments. 
Managers have a preference for satisfying their own goals and maximizing their 
own utility first and only secondarily that of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). To mitigate this problem, control of the managers is required. A solution 
for this problem is to issue more debt and therefore, it suggests a positive relation 
between growth and leverage. 
These two theories contradict each other. The empirical research parts of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988) find a negative relation 
between growing firms and leverage. Therefore, this study assumes that there is a 
negative relation between growth and leverage but faster adjustment speed towards 
target leverage. 
Profitability 
Profitability also influences the capital structure. Researchers have found that there 
is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage (Ozkan, 2001), which 
is explained by the pecking order theory. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman 
and Wessels (1988) have also found that there is a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. The pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer 
internal funds over outside finance (Myers, 1984). But the trade-off theory claims 
that as the firms are profitable so they would prefer to access external funds rather 
than using their internal funds to finance their projects. 
Profitable firms usually have more ease to access external funds to finance 
their projects. TOT suggests that there's a positive relationship between leverage 
and profitable firms. Having all the financing options in hand, it will be easier and 
quicker for profitable firms to adjust their leverage targets. 
Chinese researchers have shown that there is a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage (Chen, 2004; Tong & Green, 2005; Huang 
& Song, 2006; Anwar & Sun, 2013; Zou & Xiao, 2006; DeJong et al., 2008). 
Therefore, a negative relationship between profitability and leverage and faster 
adjustment is assumed for this study.
Adjustment Behaviour of Leverage in Chinese SOEs and Non SOEs
105
Tangibility 
Tangibility is defined as the collatralisable assets which can be used to get loans. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), issuing debt by this way helps a firm avoid 
associated costs. So, this finding suggests that tangibility has a positive correlation 
with leverage which supports the trade-off theory. Researchers have shown mixed 
results as some researchers find a positive relationship between tangibility and 
leverage (Wald, 1999; Viviani, 2008; DeJong et al., 2008; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988) and others have shown a negative relationship 
between these variables (Mazur, 2007; Karadeniz, Yilmaz Kandir, Balcilar, & 
Beyazit, 2009). Booth et al. (2001) have given evidence in their study on the firms 
in Pakistan, India, Brazil and Turkey that there is a negative relationship between 
tangibility and leverage. It is expected that firms with more tangible assets have 
more access to both sources of funds (debt/equity) so such firms are more likely to 
attain their target leverage.
Chinese Researchers like Chen (2004) and Huang and Song (2006) in their 
few studies on the Chinese market have found that there is a positive relationship 
between tangibility and leverage. Therefore, this study assumes a positive relation 
between tangibility and leverage.
Non-debt Tax Shield (NDTS) 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), NDTS is an alternative to tax shield 
on debt financing. When firms' income is consistently becoming low or negative 
then non-debt tax shield is applicable to them. Studies have shown quite mixed 
results regarding the relationship between NDTS and leverage. Bradley, Jarrell and 
Kim (1984) have shown a positive relationship between the NDTS and leverage 
but Wald (1999) has shown a negative correlation between NDTS and leverage. 
In China, researchers have shown that there is a negative relationship 
between NDTS and leverage. Huang and Song (2006) and Anwar and Sun (2013) 
provide evidence for negative relationship between NDTS and leverage. They 
provide evidence that Chinese firms consider it only in long term debt financing so 
tax has very low significance. In this case the adjustment speed for firms towards 
their target capital structure is expected to be slower.
Tax
Tax is a very important factor which determines the capital structure for firms as 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) have suggested that companies should gain more 
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debt financing because financing through debt allows firms to avail tax deductions 
associated with it due to interest payments on debt. So researchers like Sett and 
Sarkhel (2010) have found that there is a positive relationship between effective 
tax rate and leverage. 
Chinese researchers Huang and Song (2006) have shown that there is a 
negative relationship between tax rate and leverage which supports the pecking 
order theory. But Chen and Strange (2005) have shown that there is no significant 
relationship of tax rate with leverage in China. However, for the purposes of this 
study, it is assumed that there is a negative relation between tax and leverage. So, 
it can be assumed that when tax rate is high (increasing) then firms are expected to 
be quick to adjust to their target capital structure and vice versa.
Volatility
Volatility is a very important factor to determine capital structure of firms as it 
measures the probability of financial distress. Researchers like Choi and Richardson 
(2016), DeJong et al. (2008) and Booth et al. (2001) have found that there is a 
negative relationship between volatility and leverage.
Chinese researchers like Huang and Song (2006) and Anwar and Sun 
(2013) have also confirmed the same results and have provided evidence that there 
is a significantly negative relationship between volatility and leverage. Therefore, 
this study assumes a negative relation between volatility and leverage and a slower 
adjustment speed to achieve target leverage.
Liquidity
Liquidity is a very important determinant of capital structure of firms. Capital 
structure theories take the relationship of liquidity with leverage in different ways 
as the trade-off theory argues a positive relationship between liquidity and leverage 
and proposes that firms with higher liquidity ratios should go for debt or borrowings 
which can facilitate companies to adjust their capital structure ratios instantly. 
While, on the other hand, pecking order theory shows a negative relationship 
between liquidity and leverage because firms with higher liquidity ratios prefer 
to use internal funds (retained earnings) to finance their new investment projects 
(Viviani, 2008). Researchers like Mazur (2007) and Qureshi, Imdadullah and 
Ahsan (2012) have given their findings which are consistent with the pecking order 
theory. Therefore, this study assumes a negative relationship between liquidity and 
leverage but faster adjustment speed towards the target leverage.
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Economic Growth
GDP is considered as the measure of the welfare of the economy. A low GDP 
reflects low expenditure by firms and consumers and vice versa (Gleditsch, 2002). 
GDP growth is taken as the measure of economic growth in this study. Various 
studies have shown the relationship between GDP growth and capital structure 
decisions of firms. Researchers have shown that GDP growth and capital structure 
have negative relationship (Dincergok & Yalciner, 2011; Camara, Pessarossi, 
& Rose, 2014). Researchers argue that an increase in the GDP growth rate will 
increase the profits so firms would prefer to use their internal funds, which is a 
basic assumption of the pecking order theory (Gajurel, 2006). Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) have given evidence in their study that negative correlation of GDP growth 
rate and leverage would confirm the pecking order theory and positive relationship 
would support the trade-off theory. It can be assumed that firms in countries with 
sound economic growth are expected to adjust to their target capital structure 
quicker than firms in countries with poor economic growth.
Another study, conducted by DeJong et al. (2008) in a sample of 42 
countries from 1997–2001, found that not only firm specific factors like tangibility, 
size, profitability and growth opportunities but country specific factors like 
economic growth (GDP Growth) are also important factors in determining the 
capital structure decisions. They have shown that there is a positive relationship of 
economic growth with the corporate capital structure and they further argue that 
in countries with stronger and sound legal systems, firms prefer debt over equity. 
In short, country specific factors are important while deciding capital financing 
options for firms. Therefore, a positive relationship between economic growth and 
leverage is assumed for this study.
Inflation Rate
Inflation rate is a measure to check the uncertainty in economy. It is one of the 
important country specific variables to determine the capital structure of firms. 
Researchers have found mixed results as Frank and Goyal (2009) have found 
that there is no relationship between inflation and capital structure of a firm but 
Gajurel (2006) has found that there is a negative relationship between inflation and 
capital structure. In this case firms will be slower to adjust their targeted capital 
structure. Contrary to this, researchers like Sett and Sarkhel (2010) and Hanousek 
and Shamshur (2011) have found that there is a positive relationship between 
inflation rate and leverage and it supports the TOT, which suggests that adjustment 
speed towards their optimal capital structure is expected to be quicker. Therefore, 
a positive relation between inflation and leverage is assumed for this study.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this research article, annual data has been used from the financial statements of 
non-financial firms of China for the time period of 2003–2012. This time period 
exactly shows the impact of financial crisis on the capital structure of firms in 
China. For this research, data has been taken from very reliable Chinese databases 
like RESSET and CSMAR. Firm level data (Profitability, Size, Tangibility, 
Liquidity, Non-Debt Tax Shield and Volatility) has been accessed from RESSET 
and CSMAR while economic data (Economic growth, Tax Rate and Inflation) has 
been taken from EIU-Country Data. Table 1A (see Appendix A) shows the list of 
all variables and its proxy descriptions with expected relationships with leverage. 
Data has been carefully selected for the firms and excludes firms on the 
basis of following criteria as mentioned by Harrison and Widjaja (2014):
1. Financial institutions such as banks, insurance firms, leasing firms, private 
equity and investment firms.
2. Newly listed or delisted firms during the period of research 2003–2012.
3. Non-availability of certain accounts to calculate variables (Profitability, 
Size, Tangibility, Liquidity, Non-Debt Tax Shield, Volatility, Economic 
growth, Tax Rate and Inflation).
4. The leverage value is larger than the total asset value.
On the basis of above criteria, there are 867 firms in total from various 
sectors listed on both Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges (Refer Table 2A 
in Appendix B for the distribution of firms across industries). Further we base 
our model on the dynamic trade off theory as suggested by Fischer, Heinkel and 
Zechner (1989), Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009), and Öztekin and Flannery 
(2012). Harford et al. (2009) study is based on deviation from a target level by 
calculating the difference between actual and estimated values. However this study 
uses generalized method of moments to calculate speed of adjustment for Chinese 
firms. For generalized method of moments this study utilizes estimation model and 
techniques employed by Haron et al. (2013) and Memon, Rus and Ghazali (2015) 
to estimate the adjustment speed of leverage in Chinese firms.
Model Development
LEVit = γβ0 + ρLEVit–1 + δ1PROFit + δ2SIZEit + δ3TANGit + 
δ4LIQit + δ5VOLit + δ6GPit + δ7NDTSit + δ8TAXit + 
δ9EDit + δ10INFit + ηi + λt + υit 
(1)
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where,
LEVit is the total leverage which can be calculated by total debt ratio, PROF is the 
profitability, SIZE is the size of the firm, TANG is the tangibility, LIQ is the firm's 
liquidity, VOL is the volatility in earnings, GP is growth potential of a firm, NDTS 
is the non-debt tax shield, INF is the inflation, ℮ = random error term, i = firms in 
the same cross-section (e.g., 1, 2, 3 ... n), and t = period of time (years).
During analysis we incorporate a dummy for SOE. We follow Safdar and 
Yan (2016) to classify firms into state-owned and non-state-owned firms. We take 
those firms as state owned enterprises in which government shares are at least 
25%. For any given year for a firm having more than 25 % state ownership it is 
categorised as a state owned firm and variable SOE has the value of 1 for such 
firms and 0 otherwise. In order to address the issue of any possible endogeneity 
and problems associated with a target level of capital structure the study uses 
a dynamic model based on the following equation (Oztekin & Flannery, 2012; 
Haron et al., 2013).
LEVit – LEVit–1 = γ(LEV *it – LEVit–1) (2)
In Equation 2, (LEV *it – LEVit-1) shows the adjustment required by a firm to 
adjust to a target level. γ is the coefficient of adjustment. Values of this coefficient 
ranges from 0 to 1. If γ is equal to zero then LEVit = LEVt-1 which implies that the 
firm does not try to achieve an optimal level of a leverage due to the associated 
costs and wants to remain with its current policy. However if γ is equal to 1 then 
LEVit = LEV*it . In this case the firm wants to achieve a target level of leverage.
By putting Equation 1 into Equation 2 we get the following equation:
LEVit = γβ0 + (1–γ)LEVit–1 + γβ1PROFit + γβ2SIZEit + γβ3TANGit 
+ γβ4LIQit + γβ5VOLit + γβ6GPit + γβ7NDTSit  
+ γβ8TAXit + γβ9EDit + γβ10INFit + ηi + λt + γeit 
(3)
In Equation 3, corresponds to firm specific effects while  are the time 
specific effects. Simplifying Equation 3 following equation results.
LEVit = γβ0 + ρLEVit–1 + δ1PROFit + δ2SIZEit + δ3TANGit + 
δ4LIQit + δ5VOLit + δ6GPit + δ7NDTSit + δ8TAXit  
+ δ9EDit + δ10INFit + ηi + λt + υit 
(4)
All other variables are mentioned and described in Table 1A (see Appendix).
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Data panelling methods and random effect model have been used in this 
model. The RE model applies a different intercept for each data unit in both cross-
section and time series in order to maintain the level of degrees of freedom. Data 
has been analysed and run through Stata to examine the presence of significant 
correlation between the independent variables (Profitability, Size, Tangibility, 
Liquidity, Non-Debt Tax Shield, Volatility, Growth Potential, Economic growth, 
Tax Rate and Inflation) and the dependent variable (total leverage).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable 
Overall SOEs NSOEs
Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D.
TD 8790 0.61 0.60 4586 0.55 0.29 4204 0.68 0.81
TAX 8790 0.23 0.08 4586 0.23 0.08 4204 0.22 0.08
NDTS 8790 0.02 0.03 4586 0.02 0.03 4204 0.01 0.03
VOL 8790 0.17 0.49 4586 0.14 0.40 4204 0.21 0.57
PROF 8790 0.09 0.23 4586 0.08 0.21 4204 0.09 0.26
LIQ 8790 1.34 0.97 4586 1.31 0.93 4204 1.37 1.00
TANG 8790 0.30 0.19 4586 0.32 0.19 4204 0.28 0.18
SIZE 8790 21.78 1.28 4586 21.94 1.17 4204 21.62 1.38
GP 8790 1.43 1.27 4586 1.30 1.15 4204 1.56 1.37
GDP 8790 10.45 1.77 4586 10.48 1.76 4204 10.42 1.77
INF 8790 3.08 2.09 4586 3.08 2.09 4204 3.07 2.10
Notes: TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate measured through the ratio of company' 
income to the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT measured by the standard 
deviation in EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity measured 
through networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets with total assets. 
SIZE is firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm 
measured by taking the ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. 
INF is the inflation rate. S.D. = Standard Deviation
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide results of our analysis. Table 1 represents the descriptive 
statistics. It indicates that the mean value of leverage ratio is higher for the non-
state owned enterprises than for the state-owned enterprises in China. However, 
the corporate tax rate is higher for the state-owned enterprises which might imply 
that state owned enterprises have better and efficient utilisation of leverage as 
compared to non-state owned enterprises. But the profitability rate is almost equal 
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between state owned and non-state owned enterprises. The non-debt tax shield is 
slightly higher for state owned enterprises. State owned enterprises report a higher 
tangibility ratio compared to non-state owned enterprises. The liquidity position 
has good prospects for SOEs and NSOEs as both have almost equal liquidity ratio 
compared to overall firms. Table 1 reports similar size for both state owned and 
non-state owned enterprises, which excludes size biasness from the analysis of 
separate sub samples of SOEs and NSOEs.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix, the star sign indicates a significance 
of correlation between variables at 95 % significance level. The table indicates that 
there is no significant positive correlation between independent variables that can 
lead to the problem of multicolinearity.
Table 2
Correlation matrix
Variables TD TAX NDTS VOL PROF LIQ TANG SIZE GP GDP INF
TD 1
TAX 0.040* 1
NDTS -0.134* 0.052* 1
VOL 0.2270* 0.062* -0.138* 1
PROF -0.002 0.019 0.013 0.014 1
LIQ -0.334* -0.122* -0.087* -0.144 0.069* 1
TANG -0.030* 0.122* 0.449* 0.0056 -0.035* -0.342* 1
SIZE -0.188* -0.034* 0.182* -0.191 0.098* -0.118* 0.1084* 1
GP 0.055* -0.053* -0.121* 0.0975 0.123* 0.2288* -0.106* -0.402* 1
GDP 0.008 0.1004* 0.0513* 0.0141 0.0277* -0.054* 0.0584* -0.137* 0.1633* 1
INF -0.007 0.036* 0.0257* -0.002 0.0233* -0.0043 0.0079 -0.041* -0.0151 0.4397* 1
Notes: * represents significance at 95% significance level. TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate 
measured through the ratio of company' income to the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT 
measured by the standard deviation in EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity 
measured through networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets with total assets. SIZE 
is firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm measured by taking the 
ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. INF is the inflation rate.
Regression Analysis
Tables 3, 4 and 5 represent regression output for overall, state owned and non-state 
owned firms respectively. Results include the impact of firm and country level 
characteristics on the leverage policy of Chinese Firms. Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 
3, 4 and 5 represent the results of Arellano Bond (GMM1) and Arellano, Bond and 
Sultan Sikandar Mirza et al.
112
Bundell (GMM2) regressions, respectively, for the dynamic model of our study. 
Columns 3 and 4 represent results for fixed effects with an autoregressive term 
(FE [AR]) and simple fixed effects (FE), respectively. Table 3 pertains to overall 
firms, while Tables 4 and 5 represent results for state owned and non-state owned 
enterprises respectively. The use of GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) is to 
estimate the adjustment speed for firms. By adjustment speed we mean with what 
speed the firm is going to change its leverage policy.
Adjustment Behaviour in Chinese Firms
Two GMM models were used to determine the adjustment speed of leverage 
policy in Chinese firms. This adds robustness to our study. GMM1 (Arellano 
Bond) indicates an adjustment coefficient of 0.936 for overall firms. This indicates 
an adjustment speed of approximately 0.07 (1–0.936). This speed according to 
our GMM2 (Arellano, Bond and Blundell) is approximately 0.35 (1–0.65) which 
indicates that Chinese firms take almost 3.5 years to adjust to their target leverage 
policy. Adjustment speed for Chinese firms before and after the 2008 crisis provides 
some important insight and empirical findings. Tables 6 and 7 represent results 
for leverage adjustment and its determinants before and after the 2008 crisis. 
According to Table 6, the coefficient for lagged leverage (Lev1) is positive for both 
GMM1 and GMM2, however it is statistically insignificant, but if we look at the 
findings of Table 7, it provides some interesting findings. The adjustment speed is 
0.23 (1–0.77) according to GMM1 (Table 7). GMM2 reports an adjustment speed 
of 0.12 (1–0.88) (see Table 7). This shows that reliance on trade off model of 
capital structure decreases after the 2008 crisis. It means after the 2008 crisis, 
Chinese firms were more inclined to follow a trade-off model of financing rather 
than target leverage.
Adjustment Behaviour of State owned and Non-state owned enterprises
Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 4 and 5 represent results for our generalised method 
of moments (GMM) models for state-owned and non-state owned enterprise. The 
results indicate that GMM1 and GMM2 report higher adjustment coefficients for 
state owned enterprises and report a lower coefficient for non-state owned enterprise. 
This shows that state owned enterprises take longer to adjust to their target level of 
leverage than non-state owned enterprises. Results of both GMM1 and GMM2 are 
consistent with our findings, which add robustness to our results. GMM1 reports 
an adjustment coefficient of 0.48 (1–0.52) for state owned enterprise, while for 
non-state owned enterprises it reports a coefficient of 0.11 (1–0.89), which is lower 
than the coefficient for state owned enterprise indicating a lesser time taken by 
non-state owned enterprises to adjust to their target level of leverage policy. 
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Table 3
Regression results for overall firms
GMM1 GMM2 FE(AR) FE
Lev(l1) 0.936*** 0.657***
(0.008) (0.018)
TAX -0.042 -0.045 -0.047 -0.06***
(0.038) (0.033) (0.058) (0.065)
NDTS -0.238 -0.313 -0.024* -0.737**
(0.103) (0.105) (0.110) (0.151)
VOL 0.027** 0.042** 0.008 0.023
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
PROF 0.027** 0.021** 0.030** 0.01
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
LIQ -0.088** -0.086 -0.11** -0.153**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
TANG -0.056** -0.073*** 0.152 0.084***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.038) (0.037)
SIZE -0.052** -0.021*** -0.15** -0.067**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
GP 0.002 -0.002 0.023 0.029***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
GDP -0.007** -0.003** -0.01** -0.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
INF 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
CONSTANT 1.404*** 0.839 4.208 2.369***
No of instruments 55.000 47.000
Abond Test 0.062 0.173
Sargan Test 62.660 42.318
Adj. R-square 0.122 0.179
Bhargava et al. (Ramaswami, 
Srivastava, & Bhargava, 2009)
0.805
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.084
Hausman Test 186.040 134.090
Notes: *, **, *** shows significance at 90%, 95% and 99% respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses 
(). TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate measured through the ratio of company' income 
to the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT measured by the standard deviation 
in EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity measured through 
networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets with total assets. SIZE is 
firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm measured 
by taking the ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. INF is the 
inflation rate.
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Table 4
Regression results for state owned enterprises
 GMM1 GMM2 FE(AR) FE
Lev(L1) 0.528*** 0.301***
(0.008) (0.009)
TAX -0.055 -0.039 -0.013 -0.384
(0.031) (0.027) (0.054) (0.588)
NDTS 0.202** 0.201** 0.25** 0.87***
(0.087 (0.084) (0.101) (1.300)
VOL -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.070 -0.17***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.063)
PROF 0.04*** 0.045*** -0.008 0.161**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.142)
LIQ -0.087** -0.078* -0.08** -0.10***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.036)
TANG 0.127** 0.087*** 0.081** 0.067**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.260)
SIZE -0.003** -0.023*** -0.04** -0.002**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.046)
GP 0.002** 0.004** 0.009* 0.037**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.029)
GDP -0.003** -0.001** -0.03** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021)
INF 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.013)
Constant 0.387 0.027 -0.382 0.820***
No. of Instruments 55.000 47.000
Abond Test 0.237 0.489
Sargan Test 52.010 46.230
Wald chi2 1474.070
Adj R-square 0.161 0.221
Bhargava et al. 0.94
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.15
Hausman Test 131.09 104.37
Notes: *, **, *** shows significance at 90%, 95% and 99% respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate measured through the ratio of company' income to 
the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT measured by the standard deviation 
in EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity measured through 
networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets with total assets. SIZE is 
firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm measured 
by taking the ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. INF is the 
inflation rate.
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Table 5
Regression results for non-state owned enterprises
GMM1 GMM2 FE(AR) FE
LEV(L1) 0.899*** 0.644***
(0.010) (0.019)
TAX -0.010 -0.016 -0.047 0.679
(0.052) (0.049) (0.101) (1.066)
NDTS 0.257 0.243 0.246 -3.556**
(0.164) (0.175) (0.204) (2.527)
VOL 0.001 0.039 0.008 0.069
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.095)
PROF 0.087** 0.072** 0.050*** -0.351
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.299)
LIQ -0.119** -0.110** -0.168** -0.136**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.081)
TANG 0.064 0.019 0.143*** 2.043**
(0.054) (0.074) (0.064) (0.590)
SIZE -0.122*** -0.065** -0.169** -0.187**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.084)
GP 0.016**** 0.009** 0.035** 0.104**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.044)
GDP -0.014*** -0.008** -0.014** -0.036**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.035)
INF 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.026)
Constant 3.005 1.850 4.595 4.347***
No of Instruments 55.0 47.0
Abond Test 0.4 0.7
Sargan Test 67.0 57.3
Wald chi2 2277.0
Adj R-square 0.18 0.10
Bhargava et al. 0.77
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.08
Hausman Test 123.07 107.65
Notes: *, **, *** shows significance at 90%, 95% and 99% respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate measured through the ratio of company' income 
to the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT measured through the standard 
deviation of EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity measured 
through networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
SIZE is firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm 
measured by taking the ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. 
INF is the inflation rate.
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Table 6
Regression analysis before crises for overall firms
 GMM1 GMM2 FE(AR) FE
Lev(L1) 0.438 0.008
(0.111) (0.033)
TAX 0.056 -0.105 -0.103* -0.156
(0.155) (0.085) (0.104) (0.107)
NDTS 0.137** 0.536 0.09** 0.084**
(0.251) (0.334) (0.176) (0.204)
VOL -0.083 -0.059 -0.01** -0.04**
(0.041) (0.035) (0.019) (0.015)
PROF -0.024 -0.087 -0.021 -0.01**
(0.024) (0.029) (0.015) (0.019)
LIQ -0.095** -0.093** -0.10** -0.121
(0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
TANG 0.108** 0.062** 0.130 0.147
(0.123) (0.085) (0.055) (0.053)
SIZE -0.170 -0.029** -0.16** -0.2***
(0.072) (0.035) (0.019) (0.014)
GP -0.013 0.003 0.043 -0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP -0.039 -0.012* -0.01** -0.04**
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
INF -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
_cons 4.175** 0.943** 4.389** 5.629
No of Instruments 43 35
Abond Test 0.235 0.392
Sargan Test 53 31
Wald chi2 1234
Adj R Square 17.05 18.12
Bhargava et al. 1.29
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.86
Hausman Test 136 119
Notes: *, **, *** shows significance at 90%, 95% and 99 % respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate measured through the ratio of company' income 
to the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT measured through the standard 
deviation of EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity measured 
through networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
SIZE is firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm 
measured by taking the ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. 
INF is the inflation rate.
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Table 7
Regression analysis for overall firms after crises–2008 
 GMM1 GMM2 FE(AR) FE
Lev(L1) 0.774*** 0.884***
(0.035) (0.014)
TAX -0.029 -0.021 -0.251** -0.150
(0.053) (0.056) (0.115) (0.116)
NDTS 0.513*** 0.423** 0.793*** 0.238
(0.181) (0.167) (0.222) (0.209)
VOL 0.017 0.015 0.060** 0.030
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019)
PROF -0.020 -0.007 -0.044** -0.04**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023)
LIQ -0.073** -0.072** -0.112** -0.12**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
TANG -0.140** -0.141** 0.030 0.044
(0.052) (0.054) (0.095) (0.076)
SIZE -0.022 -0.048*** -0.203** -0.16**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.028) (0.018)
GP 0.004 0.004 0.033** 0.019**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
GDP 0.000 -0.008** -0.055** -0.03**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006)
INF -0.001 0.001 0.017*** 0.009**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
_cons 0.762** 1.346** 5.734** 4.584**
No of Instruments 37 41
Abond Test 0.21 0.43
Sargan Test 57 66
Wald chi2 1342
Adj R Square 14 25
Bhargava et al. 0.997
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.79
Hausman Test 143 112.08
Notes: *, **, *** shows significance at 90%, 95% and 99% respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
TD is the total debt to asset ratio. TAX is the corporate tax rate measured through the ratio of company' income 
to the tax paid. NDST is the non-debt tax shield. VOL is the volatility in EBIT measured through the standard 
deviation of EBIT. PROF is the profitability measured through return on equity. LIQ is the liquidity measured 
through networking capital. TANG is the tangibility measured through the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
SIZE is firm's size measured by taking the natural log firm's total assets. GP is the growth potential of each firm 
measured by taking the ratio of firm's total market value and book value. GDP is the real annual growth in GDP. 
INF is the inflation rate.
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GMM2 (Arellano, Bond and Bundell GMM) of column 2 in Tables 4 and 
5 also indicates that state owned enterprises take longer time to adjust to their 
leverage policy. It reports an adjustment coefficient of 0.70 (1–0.30) for state-
owned and 0.66 (1–0.36) for non-state owned enterprises. This again shows that 
state owned enterprises take more time to adjust to their target leverage ratio.
Table 8 provides the mean difference analysis through ANNOVA. It 
clearly indicates that difference of means for leverage between SOEs and NSOEs 
is statistically significant.
Table 8
Annova analysis for SOEs and NSOEs
Variable Mean of leverage
SOE 0.55
NSOE 0.68
F-value 31.07
Probability of F 0.000
Firm and Country Level of Determinants of Leverage in Chinese Firms
Results for overall firm (Table 3) show negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for TAX, SIZE, and LIQ. This shows that higher tax forces the firms 
to adjust their leverage policy to a downward point. VOL is negatively related to 
leverage and the relationship is statistically significant. This shows that higher the 
volatility in earnings (EBIT), lesser is the firm reliance on debt. Similarly volatility 
in EBIT is also a sign of an uncertain position that compels firms to take less 
leverage in order to avoid risks associated with financial distress. Growth potential 
(GP) showed a positive and significant coefficient for overall firms. This shows 
that bigger sized firms have greater following and lower information asymmetry. 
They have greater access to the debt market. Moreover if such firms have growth 
potential it will lead these firms to raise more and more debt. Similarly profitability 
shows a positive relationship with debt which shows that profitable firms are at a 
safer position to raise more debt and thus profitability positively influences the 
leverage level in Chinese firms. Firm's liquidity has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with leverage in Chinese firms which implies that liquid 
firms tend to raise less debt as compared to firms with low level of liquidity. 
As far as the country level determinants of leverage are concerned, GDP 
shows an astonishingly negative and statistically significant relationship with 
leverage. One explanation in this regard might be that GDP growth in most of the 
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years covered by this study is negative and thus it can be inferred that firms tend 
to lower their leverage with the prospect of a slow growth rate. Moreover inflation 
is found to have no relationship with leverage policy for overall firms in China.
Results in Tables 4 and 5 correspond to state owned and non-state owned 
enterprises respectively. Table 4 shows that NDTS shows a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with leverage policy. The positive relationship of growth 
potential with leverage implies that even in time of higher growth prospect the 
leverage policy of state owned enterprises shows an upward trend. Firm's size, 
liquidity, and tangibility show a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with firm's leverage.  Profitability shows a positive relationship with leverage for 
SOEs. SOEs with profitability are at greater ease to raise more funds through debt. 
Similarly tangibility also adds to firms' ability to raise more debt since the fixed 
assets can be used as collateral to raise funds.
For NSOEs, results in Table 5 indicate that NDTS and SIZE have a negative 
and statistically insignificant relationship. This is in contrast to state owned 
enterprises. This shows these two factors might not be applicable while considering 
the upward trends in a leverage policy of non-state owned enterprises. Liquidity 
also shows a negative and statistically significant relationship with leverage of non-
state owned enterprises. The growth potential shows a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with leverage of non-state owned Chinese enterprises and 
thus implies that in time of growth opportunities non-state owned enterprises tend 
to raise more funds through debt. GDP shows negative and statistically significant 
relationship with leverage for both state owned and non-state owned enterprises, 
while inflation is found to have no relationship with leverage for both state owned 
and non-state owned enterprises.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study is intended to find out the relationship of leverage with country and 
firm level characteristics. This study is unique because it not only estimates the 
adjustment speed in leverage policy for Chinese firms but also finds the adjustment 
speed for SOEs and NSOEs. For this purpose the sample for overall firms is divided 
into state owned and non-state owned enterprises. To find out the adjustment speed 
the study used multiple GMM for the purpose of robustness. Both of the GMM 
report a positive and statistically significant adjustment coefficient, which implies 
that current leverage is dependent on past leverage and that Chinese firms follow 
a target level of leverage by adjusting their current leverage policy. It was further 
found that state owned enterprises report a high adjustment coefficient than non-
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state owned enterprises, which implies that non-state owned enterprises take longer 
to adjust to their target level of leverage.
Apart from adjustment speed, firm and country level determinants of 
leverage were also tested for their relationship with leverage policy in Chinese 
firms. It is found that firms' size, profitability, growth potential, and tangibility 
have a significant influence on firms' leverage policy. Small sized firms and firms 
with higher growth prospect tend to raise more debt to finance their investment 
decisions. Moreover firms having profitability and greater tangibility are at ease 
to raise more debt. Volatility in earnings reported a negative and statistically 
insignificant relationship which indicates that in times of higher volatility firms 
tend to reduce their debt level in order to cope with financial distress risk associated 
with higher level of debt. GDP is found to have a negative relationship since in 
most of the years covered by this study the real growth in GDP is negative. Inflation 
shows no relationship with leverage policy of Chinese firms.
Thus this study adds useful insights on the adjustment behaviour of Chinese 
firms with regard to their leverage policy and also the firm specific and country 
level determinants of leverage policy. The study provides useful evidence on the 
adjustment behaviour of Chinese state owned and non-state owned enterprises 
having policy implications for the managers of these companies.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1A
Independent variables, their description and expected relationship with leverage in 
Chinese firms
Variable name Model name Proxy Effect on leverage (+/-)
Tax rate TAXit Effective rate % -
Non-debt tax shield NDTSit Depreciation expenses/total assets -
Volatility VOLit Standard deviation of EBT/total 
equity
-
Profitability PROFit Profit before tax/total equity -
Liquidity LIQit Current assets/current liabilities -
Growth potential GPit Tobin's Q (ratio of market to book 
value of assets)
-
Tangibility TANGit Net fixed assets/total assets +
Firm size SIZEit ln(total assets) +
Economic growth EGt % change of GDP +
Inflation rate INFt Average of consumer price index 
and producer price index
+
Ownership O Dummy = 0 for non-state owned 
firms and 1 for state owned firms
+
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APPENDIX B
Table 2A
Distribution of firms across industries
Industry Code Industry Name No. of firms
A01 Farming 22
A02 Forestory 6
A03 Animal Husbandary 13
A04 Fishery 11
A05 Service industry for farming, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishery
2
B06 Coal mining and washing 26
B07 Exploitation of petroleum and natural gas 7
B08 Extracting and dressing of ferrous metal mines 6
B09 Extracting and dressing of non-ferrous metal ores 22
B11 Mining support activities 15
C13 Agro-food processing industry 42
C14 Foodstuff manufacturing industry 32
C15 Wine, soft drinks and refined tea industry 36
C17 Textile industry 69
C18 Leather, fur, down and related products and footwear 16
C20 Timber processing, wood, bamboo, cane, palm fibre 
and straw products
7
C21 Cabinet making industry 9
C22 Paper making and paper product industry 28
C23 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 7
C24 Culture, education, engineering beauty, sports and 
entertainment goods industry
14
C25 Petroleum refining, coking and nuclear fuel 21
C26 Chemical feedstock and chemical manufacturing industry 203
C27 Medicine manufacturing industry 179
C28 Chemical fibre manufacturing industry 25
C29 Rubber and plastic products industry 49
Total 867
